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The very same difficulty pervades the history of all higher forms of 
religion. It is a difficulty that crops up in the traditional problem of 
“faith and knowledge,” “revelation and reason” or, expressed more 
generally, “religion and science.” Today this difficulty looms before us 
like a wall, accompanied by the growing dangers, both obvious and hid­
den, of materialism and nihilism.
It appears that all attempts to separate religion and science from 
each other or to harmonize differences between religious dogmas and 
teachings on the one hand and scientific views and discoveries on the 
other have been unsuccessful. What is needed here is a foundation in 
which both religion and science can take root.
Up to now, the concept of God has been understood as providing 
such a foundation. And yet it cannot be denied that it is precisely the 
concept of God, in the form it has heretofore been presented, that con­
stitutes one of the main sources of the difficulty just mentioned. I am 
convinced that Buddhism has already possessed for a long time a basis 
for overcoming this difficulty and I would like to briefly develop my 
ideas about this matter from one particular perspective. It is well 
known that the concept of anatman (roughly, “no-self”) is central to 
Buddhism. This concept implies the negation of the reality of an exis­
tent thing, such as atman—that is, it denies that there is anything 
which, permanent and indivisible, grants identity to each being. In
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Mahayana Buddhism, the concept of anatman is used in the same way 
in two different areas: things in general and man in particular. Perhaps 
we could say that the concept of atman (“the self’) corresponds more 
or less to the concept of physical “substance” from the standpoint of 
things in general and to the concept of the “subject” (roughly in the 
Cartesian sense of the “ego” [res cogitans]) from the standpoint of 
man. The concept of atman, which includes both these meanings, 
would therefore correspond approximately to the earlier European con­
cept of “subjectum ” that is, the basis for each individual existence, 
each thing and each person. However, the Buddhist idea of anatman— 
and this is very important—denies the reality of any such subjectum.
Nevertheless, the question immediately arises: what type of existence 
does Buddhism want to indicate with the concept of anatman or non- 
subjectum? In order to answer this question, it might be helpful to com­
pare this concept with some basic concepts found in the history of 
Western spirituality.
In that history we encounter, for example, among the ideas of the 
great ancient philosopher Plotinus the concept of the One. According 
to Plotinus, the One is beyond the world, both the intelligible and the 
sensory world, that is, beyond all places where being and thinking hold 
sway. In order to come to the One, the human soul must go beyond 
itself, become the same as the One and, in a state of “ecstasy,” lose 
itself (in the sense of an egotistical self-centered subject) in the One. 
The philosophical system of Plotinus takes up Matter as the extreme 
limit—Matter which, bereft of all form, lies beyond (or more accurate­
ly, on this side of) all particular substances and which is supposed to be 
a non-being, iifj dv. Although the idealist Plotinus saw the One as the 
basic principle, modern materialism sees the “One” or single principle 
in matter (although, of course, in a transformed sense).
In view of what has just been said about Plotinus, it would appear 
that both concepts, the One and Matter, are two types of non-subjec- 
tum, although types that oppose each other. Both lie beyond the subjec­
tum: the one beyond the subject and the other beyond physical 
substance.
Nevertheless, we cannot help noticing that both the One and Matter 
have the character of a subjectum. Both possess a certain ground in 
themselves, so that we are forced to conceive of them as a subjectum. 
We cannot imagine either other than as something that is identical with
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itself and that contains its own identity in itself. How is this possible? 
Simply because both, in spite of their claim (or rather precisely because 
of their claim) to be the original principle, must appear in opposition 
to each other. Neither of the two is the other; the One is not Matter and 
Matter is not the One. Each must therefore be identical with itself. And 
it is precisely this difference that creates their subjectum character— 
although, according to Plotinus, they are supposed to lie beyond sub­
ject and substance.
What happens when something intended to be a non-subjectum 
nevertheless allows itself the character of a subjectum? First of all, 
each non-subjectum of this sort offers us a foundation upon which we 
can ground ourselves. We are always striving zealously to identify 
ourselves with this foundation. Not only the division mentioned above 
between idealism and materialism, which holds sway in the history of 
philosophy, but also the just-mentioned zeal of the representatives of 
any given age originates in the opposition between original principles. 
And this antithesis for its part is rooted in the subjectum character of 
these original principles.
Second, it is precisely such a non-subjectum, apparently offering 
man a firm foundation, that actually hinders him from penetrating 
himself and coming to an essential understanding of himself. It is ex­
actly that which people consider to be the original principle which 
blocks the way. That which provides them with solid ground for this 
very reason actually prevents them from continuing along the way to 
the self. One can see this process at work in the case of all “isms.’* 
Christian theology recognizes the concept of God as the ens 
realissimum and posits the idea of creatio ex nihilo. The concept of 
God appears to transcend all opposites: there is nothing that stands in 
opposition to God. And yet, God Himself is not nothingness. 
Nothingness (in opposition to God) and the creatures that emerge from 
nothingness are not God. God and nothingness are therefore always 
identical only with themselves. Each is actually a non-£udjecta/n and 
thus beyond all subjects and substances, although nevertheless possess­
ing the character of a subjectum. God is presented as the essence of all 
beings or as the absolute subject, before whom all human subjects as 
such are nothing. Nothingness, for its part, is presented as if it were 
something. Much later, nothingness even succeeded in becoming an 
original principle in the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. In Nietzsche’s
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active nihilism, nothingness advanced forward to God's throne and as 
a result became something profound and unfathomable. That which 
lacks any ground to stand on now offers itself as something fundamen­
tal in the duel with God. The gap between these two original principles 
became wider than that between idealism and materialism. And all this 
happened because the concepts of God and nothingness still have the 
characteristics of a subjectum and because they must always appear as 
opposites. This prevents people from fundamentally penetrating 
through to their selves in an essential way. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra 
says, “If there were gods, how could I bear not being a god? Therefore 
there are no gods!” We cannot take these well-known words of Nietz­
sche seriously enough. For they embrace the length and breadth of the 
difficulty that concerns us here.
This tendency to imagine the non-subjectum as something— that 
is, to think of it once again as having the nature of a subjectum—is 
so deep-rooted that it is already present at the emergence of the basic 
concepts mentioned above. That is why these fundamental concepts 
necessarily contain an element of ambiguity. What is to be explained 
by them by its very nature actually lies beyond the scope of subject and 
the scope of substance, outside the “sensed” and “intelligible” world. 
At the same time, however, these basic concepts can account for God 
and nothingness only by granting them the character of subject or sub­
stance. I believe this essential discord clearly shows that the thinking 
from which they originate is itself already influenced by the tendency 
mentioned above. It is precisely considerations of this sort that im­
pelled, it seems to me, the ancient Indian thinkers to arrive at the con­
cept of anatman.
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In order to prevail over the above difficulties, we must find an 
original principle which, on the one hand, does not stand in opposition 
to anything else and, on the other hand, creates no barrier on the way 
to an experience of the essential self. This means that the original princi­
ple must not have any trace of subjectunv, it must be a true non-subjec­
tum. Can the concept of anatman satisfy these conditions?
The non-subjectum has often been compared in Buddhism with the 
universe. The universe contains all things gathered together. All things 
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move freely in it. The universe never hinders them in their moving and 
acting and likewise is itself unhindered by the things moving around in 
it. All heavens and earths or, expressed in more modern terms, all galac­
tic and extra-galactic nebulae appear and exist in this universe. It is, so 
to speak, an absolutely open place for everything. The universe stands 
above all opposites.
Nevertheless, this comparison is misleading in several ways. Although 
the universe spreads out, the Buddhist non-subjectum does not spread. 
Instead, it wants to be precisely the “place” for the widespread uni­
verse itself as well as for everything physical, psychic and spiritual. The 
non-subjectum in this sense is nothing less than the absolutely open 
which truly transcends all opposites. Moreover, the non-subjectum is 
the “place” for everything in the sense that everything, material and 
spiritual, is founded essentially in it and has its ultimate truth in it. 
The same of course cannot be said about the universe.
The Buddhist non-subjectum is the original essence of all things 
material and spiritual, although it is neither material nor spiritual in 
itself. Finally: it is precisely the “place” in which man can penetrate to 
his essential self, come to himself and recognize himself.
An example from the history of Chinese Zen Buddhism will help to 
clarify this:
A monk once asked a great Zen master, “What is the original 
truth of Buddhism?” The master gave the monk a violent 
shove with his foot. Falling to the ground, the monk ex­
perienced an inner breakthrough, jumped up laughing loudly 
and cried out, “Oh wonder of wonders! I have realized imme­
diately by a hair-tip the original source of the countless 
wonderful truths, the original ground of all things.”1
1 I have deliberately avoided using Buddhist terms because they require detailed ex­
planation, which is not possible here.
What the monk means by the expression “hair-tip” is, first of all, 
the specific natural event of his fall. But it also refers to the monk 
himself who fell to the ground as well as the experience of his own fall. 
Nevertheless, we should not understand these as separate from each 
other. The whole is a single event. And that event was at that moment
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nothing other than the being of the monk himself. If we attempt to im­
agine things as separate from each other, everything is lost.
What is the meaning, then, of the expressions “the source of the 
countless wonderful truths” and “the original ground of all things?” 
These refer to none other than the non-subjectum, the absolutely open, 
which includes everything that exists in all external and internal world­
spaces and world-times. Moreover, it is particularly important to 
notice that this source was realized in the event recounted in the story.
What about the person who realizes? What is the person as the one 
realizing this source and how does he realize that source? Here again, 
he is no other than the source, the absolutely open itself. A person 
becomes one who realizes in this sense when the absolutely open place 
from which realization originates is revealed in him and through him. 
Then the one realizing is himself the place of realization. Both are the 
same: that is, the non-subjectum. The realizer realizes in himself—in 
himself as the non-subjectum—the origin of all truth.
This sameness (namely the identity of the one realizing and the place 
of realization), this non-subjectum—is it any different from the man in 
the story who fell to the ground and laughed loudly? If it were 
different, the non-subjectum would be presented once again as having 
the nature of a subjectum like the One of Plotinus, or the “substance” 
of Spinoza, or the “absolute” in which man ecstatically loses himself, 
attains mystical union with or contemplates in an intellectual way. But 
in such cases he himself is not there as the non-subjectum. As for the 
threefold aspect of the being of the man in the above-mentioned story, 
of “the source of all truths” or “the original ground of all things” and 
of the one realizing himself—these are three aspects of the same fact 
and should not be considered separate entities. Only in the sameness of 
these three can there appear the “there-ness” (Da) of the being (Da- 
sein) of the one who realized at the moment of falling. This “there- 
ness” is that of the non-subjectum within which lies the source of 
the countless wonderful truths, the original ground of all things. It 
was in this and as this “there-ness” of the non-subjectum that the 
“original truth of Buddhism” in the monk’s question was revealed. It 
was revealed in the corporal-spiritual man and indeed in that corporal­
spiritual man as he is with all his limitations. It occurred in his break­
through to the non-subjectum] it happened because the man, without 
stepping out of his corporal-mental constitution, opened himself to
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the absolutely open which exists beyond everything—beyond body and 
soul, beyond matter and spirit, even beyond the world and gods.
Here is the simplest and most fundamental revelation of original 
truth. But how does a person act who is corporal-mental while at the 
same time beyond everything? His way is often compared to that of a 
tiger or a lion. His way, in its totally unified non-subjective existence, is 
like the entire body of a lion or like the living, pouncing lion itself. 
Each individual truth or each individual thing is like a hair in the lion’s 
pelt. How is it then, when we are challenged to realize the lion itself on 
a single hair-tip? How and when is that possible? Only when the one 
realizing is himself that lion. This occurred, for example, at that mo­
ment when the monk fell to the ground and experienced pain.
However, for a truly accurate understanding of this simile, we 
should be aware of its context in Buddhist tradition. The image of the 
lion upon each of whose individual hair-tips a lion appears was very 
popular and often referred to in Mahayana Buddhist tradition. In 
order to indicate what lies behind this image, it is helpful to introduce a 
legend that expresses the Indian world-view in mythical guise:2
21 became acquainted with this legend through a lecture delivered by Mircea Eliade 
last year (19571 at Kyoto University. I reproduce a section of it here.
After his conquest of the dragon Vita, Indra decided to 
remodel and decorate the residence of the gods. Vi^vakar- 
man, the divine master-builder, worked on the residence for a 
year and succeeded in erecting a splendid edifice. But Indra 
was not satisfied. He wanted it to be larger and even more 
splendid, a structure without equal in the world.
Exhausted from his labors, ViSvakarman complained to 
Brahma the god of creation. Brahma promised to help him 
and to intervene with the help of Vispu, the highest being of 
whom Brahma himself was nothing but a tool. Vispu pre­
pared to bring Indra to his senses.
One fine day, Indra received a visit in his palace from a boy 
in tattered rags. It was Vispu himself, who had taken this 
form in order to humiliate the king of the gods. Without 
revealing his identity, he called Indra “my child” and began 
to tell him about the countless Indras who had occupied the in­
numerable universes prior to that time:
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“The life and reign of an Indra lasts eighty-one eons (one 
cycle, known as a mahayuga, is composed of 12,000 divine 
years, that is, 4,320,000 ordinary years). But in the time that 
it takes for twenty-eight Indras to pass away, only a day and a 
night have gone by for a Brahma. And though the existence 
of a Brahma, measured in such days and nights, lasts only 108 
years, whenever a Brahma passes away, another one arises. 
This endless line is incalculable. There is no end to the 
number of these Brahmas, let alone the number of Indras.
But what about the countless universes existing side by 
side at any given moment, each containing a Brahma and an 
Indra—who could calculate their number? Arising and pass­
ing away beyond the limits of sight and occupying outer space, 
these universes are an uncountable multitude. They skim 
along like fragile barks upon unfathomable and pure waters, 
together constituting the body of Vispu. On each pore of this 
body, a universe bubbles and bursts. Would you dare to 
calculate them? Would you count the gods in all these worlds, 
present and past?”
A similar world-view made its way into Buddhism. However, when 
Buddhism was assimilated by the Chinese, who are an extremely prac­
tical people, this world-view had to put aside its mythical garb and 
assume a new form more in keeping with reality. In this new view, deep 
metaphysical speculation with its own logic, ontology, theory of cog­
nition and so forth as well as existential religiosity constantly inter­
penetrate each other. However, fundamental here is the fact that, in 
spite of this transformation, the essential core of that mythical world 
outlook {Weltanschauung), that is, the original world vision or world­
view within it, remained unchanged. The fantastic, dream-like world 
outlook was transformed into a realistic, awakened world-view, a type 
of world vision that at the same time means an awakening. An ancient 
Zen didactic poem expresses this very succinctly:
“The thousand-fold great world is like foam on the sea; the line of 
saints and sages like a flash of lightning.”
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III
From this perspective, two points in the legend above assume special 
meaning. First, there is the idea of the “body” of Vispu, which is com­
pared to a shoreless sea and on whose every pore a universe “bubbles 
and bursts”; second, there is the idea that this same limitless Vispu 
takes the form of a ragamuffin boy. As for the first idea, we could say 
that a similar view provides the context for the image of the lion men­
tioned earlier. Indeed, the true meaning of that image can be clarified 
from this perspective. The image of the lion’s body signifies essentially 
the same thing as that of Vispu’s body in the Indian legend. Thus we 
can understand why the image speaks of a lion out of whose individual 
hair-tips a lion appears; the story is about a living lion in whose every 
hair that lion itself lives. This clearly expresses the similarity between 
these world-views as well as the essential differences between them that 
led to a transformation of the same world-view from a mythical, 
dream-like view to an awakened, realist view. The legend speaks about 
the bubbles on the pores of Vispu’s body. Could we also say that a Vis­
pu appears on each of these pores? Are we permitted by such an inter­
pretation to see a Vispu in each of the fleeting bubbles? It is, to be sure, 
an essential aspect of truth that the myriad universes are actually so 
many bubbles. Indeed, that is the meaning of the didactic poem quoted 
above. But if we view things merely from this standpoint, we see only 
an expression of the transitory nature of all entities, a view that tends 
toward escapism and withdrawal from real life. Going hand-in-hand 
with this is the tendency to conceive of Vispu as a subjectum, as the 
highest and all-embracing essence, for example. And with this ten­
dency comes the tug toward the dream-like.
The transformation toward a realistic sense is expressed in the image 
of the lion. Even world bubbles are, to be sure, just bubbles; and yet 
every bubble, as such, is always one and the same ocean, a manifesta­
tion of the Absolute itself. Nevertheless (and I emphasize this repeated­
ly to avoid any total misunderstanding of what I mean), we must by no 
means consider the “absolute” to be a subject or substance. We actual­
ly cannot speak here about an appearance of the absolute (in the sense 
of an absolute something). The “Absolute” is a non-subject, which 
is also known as “nothingness” or “emptiness” in Buddhism. All
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things, indeed all universes, exist on the original ground (actually non­
ground) of “emptiness.” For that which acts as the foundation of all 
things and universes cannot be something that is. Of course, this 
“nothingness” is not null any more than this “emptiness” is simply 
void. A Buddhist phrase that has become almost a truism says that 
“true emptiness is no other than wondrous being.” True emptiness, 
true nothingness, is a “sea of being” whose bubbles, which are the 
universes, together with those universes’ bubbles, which are things, are 
there because each of these is one and the same sea of being.
Mahayana Buddhist philosophical circles tend to make the same 
point with a different image, that of water and waves. The waves and 
the water, it is said, are absolutely inseparable: there are no waves 
apart from the water and no water apart from the waves. And yet, we 
can neither call the waves “water” nor call the water “waves.” Water 
is not waves and waves are not water—although there is only “a single 
One” (ein einzic ein) to use an expression of Meister Eckhart. Both of 
them, the waves and the water, are simultaneously two-and-one and 
one-and-two. This is equally true about the relation between the lion 
on the one hand and all lions and each individual lion of the hair-tips 
on the other hand. It is only in this “simultaneously one-and-two” that 
the being of “wondrous being” is present, which is at the same time the 
being of the entity, both in the totality as well as in the particular. Con­
versely, the being of the entity is at the same time the being of “won­
drous being.”
A flower, for example, which is an entity, is there in its total reality, 
regardless of how transitory and fleeting its existence may be. Its being 
is essential, for it is nothing other than “wondrous being.” Otherwise 
we cannot avoid falling into that way of thinking which imagines there 
are waves apart from the water and water apart from the waves. If that 
were the case, all things would in the long run be an illusion or ap­
pearance of an “absolute,” which, at any rate, is constantly conceived 
in a subjectum character. Nevertheless, there is “nothing” outside 
the various entities in their unending diversity and total reality at any 
given moment, just as they are there. They are truly and “in truth” 
there, precisely because there is “nothing” other than these things 
themselves. This “there is nothing other than” is the ground (actually 
non-ground) that allows all entities to exist as they are—but not as a
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subject um-type “something” like, for example, an absolute subject (in 
the personal sense) or an absolute substratum.
Buddhism speaks therefore about “true emptiness.” This “emp­
tiness” is the original ground or non-ground which allows all things to 
be as they exist and to exist as they are. “Emptiness” is nowhere and 
nevertheless there is “emptiness” everywhere that an entity exists both 
in the whole and in the particular. The water, too, is nowhere and 
nevertheless there is water everywhere that there are ocean waves. The 
water is neither the subjectum which unites all the waves nor the subjec­
tum that is the ground of all waves.
Nevertheless, the water embraces and assembles the endless waves of 
the boundless sea. The same is true about “emptiness.” Similar to the 
universe mentioned earlier, emptiness embraces and gathers together 
everything by allowing all things to be as they are in their unending 
variety and total reality. This is the true meaning of the word that I 
used above in connection with waves and water: only “a single One” 
(ein einzic ein) is there. That is to say, the One limitless sea is there. 
It is “wondrous being” which, as mentioned above, is at the same time 
the being of the entity in both the whole and the particular, while con­
versely the being of the entity is at the same time the being of “won­
drous being.”
Is this a kind of pantheism or, so to speak, pan-nihilism! If so, then 
we would again be understanding “being” and “emptiness” as having 
the nature of a subjectum whose veil (maya) is all things. But a flower is 
really and in truth there, just as a lion on the hair-tip in the simile 
above is completely a lion. The “divinity” of pantheism and the 
“nothingness” of nihilism can be easily imagined and understood. In­
deed, they reveal themselves, if at all, already and only as something 
imaginable and graspable in concepts. This pertains to the essence of 
pantheism and nihilism.
Can we, however, also realize that living lion whose body is like an 
unfathomable ocean in which all universes and all things swim and on 
whose every hair the same lion is alive? Can we grasp him while, as it 
were, standing outside of him and observing him “objectively” as an 
object? Can we imagine and conceive of him as if he were a subjectum! 
We can only realize in this way by becoming a hair ourselves, which in 
truth we are. We can only realize, that is to say, by becoming ourselves.
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But that also means the person becomes the lion itself. For, as was 
already stated, a hair of the lion and the lion itself are “a single One” 
(ein einzic ein)\ in other words, the lion on the hair-tip and the lion 
itself are simultaneously two-and-one and also one-and-two. A person 
can realize “true emptiness” or “wondrous being” only in such a way 
that he simultaneously realizes himself: as anatman, as the self-less, as 
the non-subjectum. I will return to this point later.
In this “simultaneously one-and-two” is also “nothingness” and 
“emptiness,” that is, the non-ground. In the raging foam of the world­
ocean, an unfathomable silence! The moment that we look at an entity, 
such as a flower, and look at it truly and “in truth,” it is “empty” see­
ing that sees the flower itself as “empty.” We see it then as it is, from 
its non-ground. We really see it as it truly is. At the same time, 
however, we see how that flower is there both groundless and un­
fathomable and how the flower itself is as it really and truly is.
This “emptiness” also signifies the Pure. The legend of Vispu spoke 
of the “unfathomable and pure waters.” The unfathomable silence of 
the foaming water, that is, the “water-being” of the rising and falling 
water, is the Pure. We see a flower as it truly is only when we see it 
“purely” as the Pure. It is only with pure eyes that we can see some­
thing as the Pure. Unfortunately there is not enough space here to 
discuss further what this means in relation to religious existence. But 
there is another question that is more important in connection with 
this. I have just mentioned that we see a flower as it truly is from its 
non-ground and that we see it with “pure eyes.” Both of these are ex­
pressions of the same thing. But then, one could ask, is it at all possible 
to see something from its non-ground? Does it make any sense to say 
such a thing? This so-called non-ground, if in fact there is such a thing, 
must be outside the world. How could we, who are always in the world, 
arrive at it? And even if we could, what would become of us in this 
non-ground? Would we still remain “we”? Wouldn’t we be lost in the 
non-ground? Wouldn’t we disappear? This talk about “seeing from 
the non-ground” or “seeing with pure eyes”—isn’t it just nonsense? 
We could never see with pure eyes in nothingness where there is neither 
“we” nor eyes!
In all such doubts we encounter again and again the tendency men­
tioned above to think of the non-subjectum as having the nature of a 
subjectum. However, in order to clarify a little more the anatman
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character of “true emptiness,” that is, of “wondrous being,” let us 
now turn to the second point mentioned above in the Indian legend.
IV
The form of a ragamuffin boy that Vispu takes is not his own form 
but a temporary one. The existence of the boy as such is just an ap­
pearance and not real. There is still a difference between the “in itself’ 
(An-sich) and the appearance. How was it for the monk, however, as 
he experienced a breakthrough to the original ground of all things? In 
this breakthrough, the original ground (or non-ground) was opened to 
him and through him; he himself became totally the original ground 
(or non-ground) and precisely in this way came to a realization of 
it. At the same time, he awakened fundamentally—although actually 
without any foundation—to himself and came in the genuine sense to 
self-realization.
What does all this signify for our topic of religious-philosophical ex­
istence in Buddhism? As religious existence—if we can still speak here 
in terms of “religion”—it signifies the Great Death and Great Rebirth 
which are an inseparable unity. As philosophical existence—if we can 
still speak here in terms of “philosophy”—it signifies great realization 
and “wondrous being” which are an inseparable unity. The monk 
became, as it were, a lion which is totally a lion on each of its own hair­
tips and which recognizes a lion on each of those hair-tips. We can say 
the same thing in reverse: the monk became a lion by the hair-tip of the 
lion, a lion, that is, which recognizes in itself the lion and which is the 
lion—and indeed the lion whose body, like the body of Vispu in the 
legend, is the “unfathomable, pure water” and on whose pores the 
universes bubble and burst. The monk became “true emptiness,” that 
is, “wondrous being” which is simultaneously the being of the entity 
both in the whole and in the particular. In other words, it is also the be­
ing of his existence as a patchrobed Chinese monk of the T’ang Dynas­
ty. Both of these, “wondrous being” and the being of the monk, are 
simultaneously two-and-one as well as one-and-two. As was mentioned 
above, the monk opened himself to the Absolutely Open without aban­
doning his own corporal-mental constitution.
The monk’s breakthrough occurred one fine day long ago in China, 
at the moment that he fell to the ground and experienced pain. But that
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moment is also the moment mentioned in the Indian legend: “the 
countless universes existing side by side in any given moment, each con­
taining a Brahma and an Indra—who could calculate their number?” 
In the midst of his fall and pain, the monk experienced and realized 
“true emptiness” and “wondrous being.” An ancient Buddhist think­
er, speaking of this experience, compared it to a man stroking and 
pinching his own body, to an elephant spraying itself with water 
through its trunk, to a child sticking his fingers in his mouth. All these 
expressions are talking about nothing other than that “true emptiness 
is no other than wondrous being.” They are speaking about “being” 
there\ about “there is nothing other than ...” as the absolutely open, 
as the non-ground which lets all entities be as they are in their endless 
variety. All our experiences are essentially of this sort. When we see a 
flower, hear a clap of thunder or look up in wonder at the star-filled 
sky, becoming attentive to the moral law within us—in experiencing all 
these we are basically like the child who sticks his fingers in his mouth.
“For a person who has eliminated the ends of the passions,3 even fire 
is cool,” says a famous poem by a Japanese Zen monk of the 16th cen­
tury who composed it at the very moment he was being burned in a fire 
fit by attacking warriors. Of course, the poem does not mean that fire 
ceases to be hot or that the monk feels no pain when burned. On the 
contrary, coolness here is precisely where the pain hurts and the heat is 
hot, in the sense that was described above about the unfathomable 
silence in the raging foam of the ocean. Where can this coolness be 
found? It is found in the fact that the experience of heat and pain oc­
curs as though a man were stroking and pinching his own body.
3 Perhaps the Latin expression "intentio animae" (in a very general sense) comes 
closest to the original Japanese expression which, although in common use, is difficult 
to translate.
We should be aware that such an “event” is always possible, even 
for us inhabitants of the atomic age. It is not surprising that it proves 
especially difficult for a Westerner to understand what has been hinted 
here and which sounds so strange.
Nevertheless, I believe the day will come when Westerners will 
understand this. For the West counts among its children people like St. 
Francis of Assisi. It is well known that this saint called all things 
“brother” or “sister”—not only people, but also the sun, moon,
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wind, water, fire, earth, birds and animals. Once, when St. Francis had 
to undergo an operation with a white-hot iron for his eyes which had 
gone blind, he called out, while blessing the iron: “Brother Fire, I have 
always loved you because you are the mightiest and most beautiful of 
all God’s creatures. Please have mercy on me, burn me gently so I can 
bear it!” The biographer goes on to say: “The doctor took the bright 
iron, dazzling like the sun, and when he touched the skin it sizzled to 
the touch. He guided the iron from ear to brow. The holy one smiled 
faintly like a child under the caressing hand of his mother. And as the 
other brothers started to flee from the sight and return to their cells, the 
saint said to them with the same faint smile, ‘Oh, you cowards! What 
are you afraid of? 1 didn’t feel any pain whatsoever.’ ‘It’s a miracle!’ 
the doctor cried out, for he had never seen anything like it before.” 
What does it mean when St. Francis blesses the glowing iron, calling it 
“Brother Fire,” and when he is able to maintain a faint smile while be­
ing burned? Isn’t there a crucial question here, something great which 
has never before been imagined? Call it what you will, such a miracle 
can also occur in our most ordinary daily experiences, for example, in 
seeing a flower. Indeed, all experience is essentially a miracle, a “won­
drous” wave of “wondrous being.” The “fool of God,” as St. Francis 
called himself, must have understood well what the Zen monk wanted 
to express in his verse composed in the fire.
V
We are now able to clarify the true meaning of the words that burst 
from the monk’s lips as he experienced a breakthrough to his Self: “Oh 
wonder of wonders! I have realized immediately by a hair-tip the 
original source of the countless wonderful truths, the original ground 
of all things.” It is only by means of such a breakthrough that we are 
liberated from any prejudice in favor of the world as well as from any 
tendency to run away from it. We stand now in the place of absolute 
“world affirmation.” We can travel there happily in the foaming 
world-sea. The monk became a non-subjectum, the original ground (or 
non-ground) of all things and freed himself for the two aspects of 
“beyond all things” and “on this side of all things.” But the 
“beyond” meant here is used in a sense that is stronger than its usual 
meaning; the same is true for the expression “this side.” True emp-
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tiness embraces and gathers together in itself both all entities 
“beyond” and all entities “on this side.” It lets them be as they are. It 
is, so to speak, beyond all possible “beyonds” and at the same time on 
this side of all possible “this sides.” It is the place where the true 
“beyond” and the true “this side” are one and the same. It is in this 
place that the original truth was revealed to the Chinese monk.
And when this happened, he could also see that his master, through 
his rough actions, had revealed to him the original truth that he had in*  
quired about. What does this mean? The following three situations are 
contained within it:
1. The monk could only recognize the original truth in himself by 
recognizing it in his master. But he could only realize it in his master by 
realizing it in himself. There is no difference between “in himself” and 
“in the other.” We cannot say which realization occurs first and which 
follows. There are not two realizations; instead there is only one and 
the same realization of the pure original truth which shines as a light in 
the student beyond the differences between the two persons.
2. Through this “enlightenment” the student could realize the same 
original truth both in himself as the original truth most proper to 
himself and at the same time in his teacher as the original truth most 
proper to his teacher.
3. Through this realization he was able to essentially realize himself 
and just as essentially realize his teacher. These three conditions are 
three essential aspects of the same experience. The student gained all 
these realizations as a single one at the same time. What does this 
show? Each of the two people is absolute at any given time to the ex­
tent that the original truth itself is revealed to him. Each existence is 
always a totality in itself, in the same way that the universe is a totality.
Each stands, as it is often said in Zen, “between heaven and earth as 
the only one.” Between the two men is absolute difference, absolute 
duality because each is absolute. But it is precisely here that we en­
counter the absolute identity of both, because each is absolute, that is, 
because the same absolute openness reigns in both men. Absolute 
difference and absolute identity are the same here. That means there is 
direct communication between the two men. And yet it is actually no 
communication because, in the case of either, everything springs from 
the individual source; there is no “communicativum” (content of com­
munication) and no “communication.” Nevertheless, the one person,
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in his realization of self, essentially realizes the other and realizes at the 
same time that the other realizes him essentially. Something of this sort 
can happen only on the ground of the non-subjectum. Our usual ways 
of communicating with gestures, words and expressions of feeling are 
always halfway and incomplete. In order for communication to 
become complete, it must always go beyond itself and return to that 
type of communication which is actually no longer communication.
What 1 have attempted to delineate here may be taken as an indica­
tion of religious-philosophical existence on the ground of anatman.
Translated by Paul Shepherd
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